The Fairness of a Fair Trial: Not Guilty Pleas and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel by Tinmouth, Leigh
Boston College Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 5 Publicity, Privacy, and Intellectual Property
Meet the First Amendment
Article 12
11-1-2009
The Fairness of a Fair Trial: Not Guilty Pleas and
the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Leigh Tinmouth
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leigh Tinmouth, The Fairness of a Fair Trial: Not Guilty Pleas and the Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 50 B.C.L. Rev. 1607 (2009), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol50/iss5/12
1607 
THE FAIRNESS OF A FAIR TRIAL: NOT 
GUILTY PLEAS AND THE RIGHT  
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE  
OF COUNSEL 
Abstract: The pervasiveness of plea bargaining in our modern justice sys-
tem has led too many courts to conclude that the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel applies to not guilty pleas. This Note ar-
gues that, although the United States Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed this issue, its decisions inform a Sixth Amendment analysis and 
indicate that the right to effective assistance of counsel is limited to pro-
viding the defendant a fair trial. The Court has suggested that a critical 
stage at which this right attaches must, in contrast to a not guilty plea, af-
fect the fairness of a defendant’s trial. It has further indicated that a de-
fendant who receives a fair trial after pleading not guilty cannot establish 
the constitutional prejudice required to demonstrate ineffective assis-
tance. Finally, the past seventy years of Supreme Court Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence supports the conclusion that the gravamen of an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim is an assertion that the defendant was de-
nied a fair trial. 
Introduction 
 A defendant is indicted for armed home invasion, armed assault 
with intent to rob, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon after 
entering a home and threatening its occupants with a machete.1 His 
lawyer incorrectly advises him that he cannot be convicted under the 
first indictment unless the Commonwealth demonstrates that the per-
sons inside the home did not consent to his entry.2 The defendant, 
based on this misinformation, rejects the Commonwealth’s proposal to 
dismiss the armed home invasion charge in exchange for a guilty plea 
to the other indictments.3 He is subsequently convicted of all of the 
above charges at a fair trial.4 On appeal, the defendant alleges ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.5 
                                                                                                                      
1 Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Mass. 2004). 
2 See id. at 992. 
3 See id. at 991. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. at 992. 
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 In 2004, this claim was addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Mahar.6 The majority concluded that 
a defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective counsel during plea 
negotiations because the decision to accept or reject a plea offer is a 
critical stage in a criminal proceeding.7 It further noted that a subse-
quent fair trial does not remedy the constitutional harm that occurred 
during the plea bargaining process.8 The concurring opinion, in con-
trast, contended that a defendant convicted at a fair trial cannot have 
been constitutionally prejudiced because a fair trial is all that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees.9 It explained that an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim focuses on whether the result of the trial was rendered 
unreliable by counsel’s performance.10 The opinion therefore con-
cluded that there was nothing fundamentally unfair in imposing the 
sentence.11 These opinions illustrate the competing positions on the 
proper scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel provided by 
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.12 Although addressed 
by numerous jurisdictions, this question remains unresolved.13 
 This Note examines the application of the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas.14 It argues that this 
right should be limited to protecting the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.15 Part I analyzes the relevant Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.16 This provides insight into the proper scope 
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. at 992–96. 
7 Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 992. 
8 Id. at 993. 
9 See id. at 997–98 (Sosman, J., concurring). 
10 Id. at 997. Justice Sosman observed that “[w]hen poor advice or misinformation has 
caused a defendant to forgo a very favorable plea opportunity, that may strike us as regret-
table or unfortunate . . . but it is not the equivalent of an ill-advised waiving of constitu-
tional rights . . . .” Id. 
11 See id. at 997–98. 
12 See id. at 992–96 (majority opinion); id. at 997–99 (Sosman, J., concurring). The 
Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379–80 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to not guilty pleas); State v. Monroe, 757 
So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel does not apply when a defendant pleads not guilty because the defendant has no 
vested interest in the enforcement of a plea bargaining contract); State v. Greuber, 165 
P.3d 1185, 1188 (Utah 2007) (ruling that a defendant who received a fair trial was not 
constitutionally prejudiced and cannot succeed on an ineffective assistance claim). 
14 See infra notes 24–300 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 24–300 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 24–130 and accompanying text. 
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of the right to effective assistance of counsel.17 Part II explains that the 
U.S. courts of appeals have unanimously concluded that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel attaches to not guilty pleas.18 Part III 
highlights how the state courts have divided over the proper scope of 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.19 Some have determined 
that the right should be applied to this context.20 Other courts, in con-
trast, have held that the scope of the right is limited to providing the 
defendant a fair trial.21 Finally, Part IV argues that the gravamen of an 
ineffective assistance claim is the assertion that the defendant was de-
prived of the right to a fair trial.22 This Part concludes that this limita-
tion on the right to effective assistance is supported by the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.23 
I. The Narrow Interpretation of the Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel 
 The U.S Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applica-
tion of the right to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas.24 
The Court’s decisions, however, inform an analysis of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel.25 In 1967, in United States v. 
Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the right to effective assistance 
of counsel to all “critical stages” of a criminal proceeding.26 A critical 
stage was defined as any stage of a criminal proceeding where counsel’s 
absence could derogate from the defendant’s right to a fair trial.27 Simi-
larly, in 1984, the U.S Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington fash-
ioned the standard for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.28 
The Court indicated that the right to effective assistance was tied to as-
                                                                                                                      
17 See infra notes 24–130 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 131–169 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 170–210 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 752–54 (Cal. 1992); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 
963, 965–67 (Fla. 1999); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 887–88 (Ill. 1997). 
21 See, e.g., Monroe, 757 So. 2d at 898; State v. Bryan, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2004); Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1188–89. 
22 See infra notes 211–300 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 211–300 and accompanying text. 
24 See Arave v. Hoffman, 128 S. Ct. 749, 750 (2008), vacating as moot 455 F.3d 926 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–94 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). 
26 388 U.S. at 224. 
27 Id. at 226. 
28 466 U.S. at 687. 
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suring the defendant a fair trial.29 Finally, the past seventy years of the 
Supreme Court’s ineffective assistance jurisprudence implies that a fair 
trial is all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees.30 
A. Critical Stage Analysis 
 In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wade articulated the critical 
stage standard.31 The defendant in the case was indicted for conspiring 
to rob, and subsequently robbing, a bank.32 Two of the bank’s employees 
observed a post-indictment lineup that was conducted in the absence of 
counsel.33 Both employees successfully identified the defendant, and he 
was convicted at trial.34 The Court observed that no organized police 
forces existed when the Bill of Rights was adopted.35 It explained that 
modern law enforcement machinery, in contrast, involved critical con-
frontations of the accused at pretrial proceedings.36 Recognizing that 
these engagements had the power to render the trial itself meaningless, 
the Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel to apply to all critical stages of a criminal proceeding.37 
 In explaining what constituted a critical stage, the Court held that 
a defendant could not be made to stand alone against the State at any 
stage of the prosecution where counsel’s absence could derogate from 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.38 The Court concluded that the de-
fendant was entitled to counsel during the pretrial lineup because the 
serious potential for prejudice, which could not be demonstrated at 
trial, made this confrontation a critical stage in a criminal proceeding.39 
 The Court conceded, however, that the analyses of an accused’s 
fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, and hair did not implicate the 
critical stage standard.40 It reasoned that the defendant, following these 
preparatory steps, retained the opportunity to meaningfully confront 
the government’s case through cross-examination of the government’s 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 684–94. 
30 See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 
U.S. 157, 175 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
31 388 U.S. at 224. 
32 Id. at 220. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 224. 
36 Id. 
37 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. 
38 Id. at 226. 
39 See id. at 236–37. 
40 Id. at 227–28. 
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expert witnesses and the presentation of the defendant’s own experts.41 
The Court noted that there was little danger that counsel’s absence 
during these stages would derogate from the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.42 It therefore determined that these analyses were not critical 
stages.43 
 In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this position again in 
United States v. Ash.44 The defendant was indicted for five counts related 
to the robbery of a bank.45 Prior to trial, the prosecutor presented five 
color photographs to the four witnesses who had previously identified a 
black-and-white photograph of the defendant.46 Three of these wit-
nesses, in the absence of counsel, again made successful identifica-
tions.47 The defendant contended that he was deprived of the right to 
counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.48 The Court noted 
that the core purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to 
provide assistance at trial.49 It explained that a confrontation ceased to 
be critical when accurate reconstruction at trial was possible.50 The 
Court, therefore, concluded that a photographic identification was not a 
critical stage because any injustice permitted in counsel’s absence was 
remedied by the opportunity to later review the photographs.51 
B. The Strickland Test 
 In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland outlined the standard 
for overturning criminal convictions arising from ineffective assistance 
of counsel.52 The respondent, during a ten-day period, committed three 
murders and engaged in torture, kidnapping, assault, attempted extor-
tion, and theft.53 He was sentenced to death for each of the three counts 
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 228. 
43 Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. 
44 See 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). 
45 Id. at 302–03. 
46 Id. at 303. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 309. 
50 Ash, 413 U.S. at 316. 
51 See id. at 317–19. 
52 See 466 U.S. at 687. 
53 Id. at 671–72. 
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of murder and received prison sentences for his additional crimes.54 
The respondent asserted that counsel was ineffective in six respects.55 
 The Supreme Court, in addressing these claims, explained that a 
defendant who alleged ineffective assistance of counsel must first dem-
onstrate that counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was 
not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment.56 This requirement is met when counsel’s representation falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.57 The second prong of 
the Strickland test requires that the defendant establish that the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense.58 The Court stated that it 
was insufficient for the defendant to show that counsel’s mistakes had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.59 It ex-
plained that this requirement is met only when it is demonstrated that 
the defendant was deprived of a fair trial whose outcome is reliable.60 
The Court held that a court examining an ineffective assistance claim 
need not address both the deficient performance and prejudice com-
ponents of this inquiry.61 Specifically, it observed that a court should, if 
it is easier, dispose of a claim for lack of prejudice without addressing 
counsel’s performance.62 
 In announcing the Strickland test, the Court reasoned that the 
right to counsel existed to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.63 
It noted that access to an attorney with sufficient skill and knowledge to 
ensure a fair trial is necessary for the defendant to meet the case of the 
prosecution.64 The Court explained that it was for this reason that the 
right to counsel has been recognized as the right to effective assistance 
of counsel.65 It stated, however, that the underlying purpose of the ef-
fective assistance guarantee was not to improve legal representation, 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. at 675. 
55 See id. The respondent contended that counsel was ineffective because “he failed to 
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to inves-
tigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to pre-
sent meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical exam-
iner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts.” Id. 
56 Id. at 687. 
57 Id. at 688. 
58 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
59 Id. at 693. 
60 Id. at 687. The Court noted that a trial was reliable when reliance on its outcome 
could be justified. Id. at 691–92. 
61 See id. at 697. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 684. 
64 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. 
65 Id. at 686. 
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but to ensure that criminal defendants received a fair trial.66 The Court 
concluded that the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness” is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the adversarial proc-
ess that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.67 
 The following year, in Hill v. Lockhart, the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed the application of the Strickland test to ineffective assistance of 
counsel in plea bargaining.68 The petitioner pleaded guilty to first-
degree murder and property theft.69 The trial court accepted the plea 
and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years for the 
murder and ten years for the theft.70 The petitioner later alleged that 
he would not have pled guilty had counsel correctly stated that half of 
the sentence had to be served before parole would be considered.71 
The Court held that the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel applied to challenges to guilty pleas.72 It noted that although the 
first prong of the Strickland test mandated the standard examination of 
attorney competence, the determination of prejudice was, in this con-
text, based on whether the defendant demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s mistakes, a guilty plea would not have 
been entered.73 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has not, since the advent of Strickland, 
had the opportunity to determine if a defendant who pled not guilty 
can successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.74 In 
2007, the Court granted a writ of certiorari in Arave v. Hoffman.75 The 
Court requested that the parties brief an issue that was not presented in 
the petition.76 The parties were asked, “What, if any, remedy should be 
provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain nego-
tiations if the defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to 
a fair trial?”77 The Court was prevented from considering this matter, 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 689. 
67 Id. at 686. 
68 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
69 Id. at 53. 
70 Id. at 54. 
71 Id. at 55. 
72 Id. at 58. 
73 Id. at 58–59. 
74 See Arave, 128 S. Ct. at 750. 
75 See 455 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 532 (2007) (No. 92-212). 
76 See Arave, 128 S. Ct. at 532–33. 
77 Id. The petitioner argued that this case provided the Supreme Court with the op-
portunity to address an important question of constitutional law. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 
6, Arave, 128 S. Ct. 749 (No. 07-110). He stated that “the Court has never addressed the 
question of effective assistance associated with recommending a plea offer be rejected, and 
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however, when the parties agreed to dismiss the case so that the peti-
tioner could proceed with resentencing.78 
C. Historic Scope of the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has developed seventy years of ineffective 
assistance jurisprudence.79 These decisions suggest that the Sixth 
Amendment affords a defendant no protection beyond the right to a 
fair trial.80 
 In 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama considered 
whether due process concerns compelled it to overturn the defen-
dants’ rape convictions.81 The defendants were not provided sufficient 
time following their arraignments to secure counsel.82 Additionally, al-
though this was a capital case, no counsel was designated until the 
morning of the trial.83 The Court concluded that a defendant’s right to 
be heard would mean little if it did not encompass the right to be 
heard by counsel.84 It noted that without counsel, defendants could be 
tried on improper charges and convicted on inadmissible evidence.85 
 The Court displayed the same focus in Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938.86 
The petitioners were charged with passing and possessing counterfeit 
currency.87 They brought a federal habeas corpus claim after being 
tried, sentenced, and convicted without counsel.88 The Court explained 
that the purpose of the right to assistance of counsel is to protect the 
defendant from a conviction arising from his ignorance of his constitu-
tional rights.89 It observed that the right embodied an understanding of 
the obvious truth that the lay defendant, when brought before a tribu-
                                                                                                                      
has not addressed the issue of effective assistance of counsel in any context of plea offers 
since Hill.” Id. 
78 Arave, 128 S. Ct. at 750. 
79 See, e.g., Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382; Nix, 475 U.S. at 175; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. 
80 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
81 See 287 U.S. at 49, 67 (1932). 
82 Id. at 53. 
83 Id. at 56. 
84 Id. at 68–69. 
85 Id. at 69. The Supreme Court stated that “[i]t was the duty of the court having their 
cases in charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial.” Id. at 52 
(emphasis added). 
86 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
87 Id. at 459–60. 
88 Id. at 460. 
89 Id. at 465. 
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nal, lacked the legal skills needed to combat experienced counsel.90 
The Court therefore reversed the petitioners’ convictions.91 
 In 1963, in the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective 
assistance of counsel was made obligatory on the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment.92 The petitioner was charged with breaking and 
entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.93 The trial court 
denied his request for appointed counsel, and he was subsequently 
convicted at trial.94 The Supreme Court observed that common sense 
dictated that a person haled into court would not be guaranteed a fair 
trial in the absence of counsel.95 It stated that, in this country, the right 
to effective assistance of counsel was deemed fundamental to assuring 
the defendant a fair trial.96 The Court therefore ruled that the right to 
effective counsel applied to the states.97 
 Similarly, in United States v. Cronic in 1984, the Court considered 
the application of the right to effective assistance of counsel when 
counsel was provided twenty-five days to prepare for a complex mail-
fraud trial.98 The Court reasoned that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel existed to protect the right of the accused to demand that the 
prosecution’s case survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial con-
frontation.99 It explained that when the reliability of the trial process is 
not challenged, a defendant’s right to effective counsel is generally not 
implicated.100 The Court stated that “the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it 
has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.”101 It concluded 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. at 462–63. 
91 Id. at 469. The Court employed the same reasoning, with the opposite outcome, in 
Avery v. Alabama in 1940. 308 U.S. 444, 453 (1940). Counsel was appointed for the defen-
dant three days before his trial for murder. See id. at 447. The trial court rejected the mo-
tion for continuance made on the ground that there had not been sufficient time to pre-
pare a defense. See id. at 447–48. The Court determined that the trial judge conducted a 
fair trial that safeguarded the defendant’s rights. Id. at 453. Thus, it held that there was no 
constitutional violation. See id. 
92 See 372 U.S. at 342. 
93 Id. at 336. 
94 Id. at 337. 
95 Id. at 344. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 342. 
98 See 466 U.S. at 649, 658. 
99 See id. at 656. 
100 Id. at 658. 
101 Id. (emphasis added). 
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that the right to effective counsel did not attach because no specific 
breakdown of the adversarial process at trial was indicated.102 
 The Court again addressed the scope of this right in Nix v. White-
side in 1986.103 The petitioner was charged with murder.104 He subse-
quently informed counsel that he planned to testify, falsely, that the vic-
tim had been holding a gun.105 This proposed testimony was never 
offered, however, because counsel stated that he would inform the 
court of the lie and withdraw from representation.106 The petitioner 
asserted that his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated 
when he was prevented from committing perjury.107 The Court noted 
that, pursuant to its holding in Strickland, the benchmark of an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim is the fairness of the adversary proceed-
ing.108 It concluded that the petitioner failed to establish constitutional 
prejudice because the confidence in the reliability of his trial was not 
diminished when he was prohibited from offering false testimony.109 
 The Court underscored this position later in 1986 in Kimmelman v. 
Morrison.110 The respondent was convicted of rape after counsel, under 
the misapprehension that the State was obligated to fully inform him of 
its case, conducted no discovery.111 In addressing this issue, the Court 
distinguished claims brought under the Fourth Amendment from 
those brought under the Sixth Amendment.112 Specifically, it observed 
that the Fourth Amendment is not a trial right.113 The Court reasoned 
that the essence of the right to effective assistance of counsel, in con-
trast, is that counsel’s errors upset the adversarial balance between the 
defense and the prosecution.114 This imbalance, it explained, yielded 
an unfair trial with a suspect verdict.115 The Court concluded that only 
                                                                                                                      
102 See id. at 658, 666. 
103 See 475 U.S. at 175. 
104 Id. at 160. 
105 See id. at 161. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 162. 
108 Id. at 175; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (1984). 
109 See Nix, 475 U.S. at 175. Justice Blackmun stated that the “touchstone of a claim of 
prejudice” is the allegation that counsel affected the fairness and reliability of the defen-
dant’s trial. Id. at 184 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
110 477 U.S. at 374–75, 382. 
111 Id. at 368–69. 
112 See id. at 374–75. 
113 Id. at 374. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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defendants who demonstrate that their counsel’s ineffectiveness de-
prived them of fair trials are entitled to retrials.116 
 The Court addressed this issue again in Lockhart v. Fretwell in 
1993.117 The defendant was convicted of capital felony murder.118 He 
contended that counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to a 
sentence based on an aggravating factor that duplicated an element of 
his murder conviction.119 The Court noted that a defendant, pursuant 
to Strickland, is required to demonstrate that counsel’s errors made the 
trial’s outcome unreliable or fundamentally unfair.120 It explained that 
an outcome-determination analysis that asked only if the outcome 
would have been different was therefore incorrect.121 The Court held 
that the proceedings were not unreliable because the defendant, in re-
ceiving a fair trial, was not deprived of any procedural or substantive 
rights.122 It thus ruled that the right to effective assistance of counsel 
was inapplicable.123 
 Finally, the Court addressed the scope of the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez in 2006.124 The de-
fendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana.125 The 
trial court repeatedly denied the defendant’s chosen lawyer’s motions 
for admission on the ground that, in a previous case, the lawyer had 
improperly communicated with a represented party.126 The defendant, 
represented by a different lawyer, was subsequently convicted at trial.127 
The Court noted that, unlike the right to select counsel, the right to 
effective counsel derived from the Sixth Amendment’s objective of pro-
viding the defendant a fair trial.128 The Court stated that the limits of 
                                                                                                                      
116 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382. Justice Powell expressed the view that “the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel is personal to the defendant, and is explicitly tied to the de-
fendant’s right to a fundamentally fair trial . . . .” Id. at 392–93 (Powell, J., concurring). 
117 See 506 U.S. at 366. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 367. 
120 Id. at 369. 
121 Id. at 369–70. The Supreme Court reasoned, “To set aside a conviction or sentence 
solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors may grant 
the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.” Id. (emphasis added). 
122 See id. at 372. 
123 See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 366. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance 
at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1069 (2009) (discussing the legal standards for asserting a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing). 
124 See 548 U.S. at 147. 
125 Id. at 142. 
126 Id. at 143. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 147. 
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the right to effective assistance derived from this same purpose.129 It 
therefore ruled that the scope of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel was limited to protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial.130 
II. Federal Courts’ Broad Interpretation of the Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 The U.S. courts of appeals that have squarely addressed this issue 
have held that the right to effective assistance of counsel does attach to 
not guilty pleas.131 These courts have concluded that the right to effec-
tive counsel is implicated by the decision to plead not guilty because it is 
a critical stage in a criminal proceeding.132 They have also held that the 
injuries inflicted by counsel satisfy the prejudice prong of the test for 
ineffective assistance outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington in 1984.133 The most illustrative cases are described below.134 
A. The Cases Extending the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel  
to Not Guilty Pleas 
 In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected 
the contention in United States ex. rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky that because the 
defendant received a fair trial, he was not entitled to a habeas remedy 
                                                                                                                      
129 Id. 
130 See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147. 
131 See, e.g., United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 44–45 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson v. 
Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1986); United States ex. rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 
F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982). Every circuit of the U.S. courts of appeals of general jurisdic-
tion has, if only in dicta, addressed the application of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel to not guilty pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1442 (10th Cir. 
1997) (ruling that a defendant who pled not guilty can establish constitutional prejudice 
by demonstrating that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness and that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have ac-
cepted the plea offer); Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1503–04 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the right to effective assistance to 
guilty pleas also extends to not guilty pleas (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 
(1985))); United States v. Rodriguez Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 753 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(explaining, in dictum, that “the fact that a defendant, after rejecting a guilty plea, still 
receives all the constitutional protections of trial does not preclude an attack on Sixth 
Amendment  grounds”). 
132 See, e.g., Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379–80 (2d Cir. 1998); Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 438. 
133 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also, e.g., Gordon, 156 F.3d 
at 379–80; Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988); Duckworth, 793 F.2d at 
902. 
134 See infra notes 135–159 and accompanying text. 
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for ineffective assistance of counsel.135 In deeming this argument “un-
tenable,” the court first observed that the decision to reject a plea offer 
and plead not guilty is a critical stage of the criminal process at which 
the right to effective counsel attaches.136 It then explained that the fail-
ure by defense counsel to communicate a plea offer prejudiced the de-
fendant by depriving him of the opportunity to plead guilty in ex-
change for a lesser sentence.137 The court held that a subsequent fair 
trial did not remedy this deprivation.138 
 In 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed 
this issue in Nunes v. Mueller.139 The respondent had sought federal ha-
beas corpus relief following his conviction for second-degree murder.140 
His claim alleged that, but for counsel’s failure to fully communicate the 
terms of the government’s plea offer, he would have pled guilty.141 The 
petitioner argued that the constitutional injury inflicted by ineffective 
counsel during plea bargaining was limited to situations where the de-
fendant pled guilty and surrendered the right to a fair trial.142 The court 
noted, however, that it had long been understood that criminal defen-
dants are entitled to effective counsel during all critical stages of the 
criminal process.143 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this included plea 
bargain negotiations because the time between the arraignment and the 
beginning of trial is one of the most critical periods of a criminal pro-
                                                                                                                      
135 See 689 F.2d at 438. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, recognizing that this ruling 
predated the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland, reaffirmed its decision in 
1992 in United States v. Day. See Day, 969 F.2d at 44–45. The defendant alleged that trial 
counsel neglected to explain that he could be classified as a career offender. Day, 969 F.2d 
at 42. Defendant further argued that he would have accepted the government’s plea offer 
had counsel informed him of his actual sentencing exposure. Id. The district court found 
that the second prong of the Strickland test was not satisfied because a defendant who re-
ceives a fair trial cannot suffer prejudice. Id. at 44. The Third Circuit conceded that the 
argument for limiting the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel to providing 
the defendant a fair trial was forceful, but cited Zelinksy in rejecting it. Id. The court also 
referred to the prejudice standard articulated in Strickland when noting that the defendant 
was required to demonstrate a “‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the results would have been different.’” Id. at 42 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694). It concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel included more 
than the Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. Id. at 45. 
139 See 350 F.3d at 1052–53. 
140 See id. at 1050. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 1052. 
143 Id. at 1052–53. 
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ceeding.144 The court, therefore, concluded that it was counsel’s duty to 
fully convey the plea offer, and that the respondent was constitutionally 
harmed when deprived of the right to participate in the plea decision.145 
 Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Johnson v. Duckworth, in 1986, considered counsel’s failure to permit the 
defendant to make the final decision regarding the disposition of a plea 
offer.146 The petitioner argued that the decision to reject a plea offer 
was the flip side of the decision to plead guilty.147 In his view it followed, 
a fortiori, that his rights were violated when counsel rejected a plea offer 
without prior consultation.148 The court, however, rejected this unre-
fined analysis.149 It noted that there is a vast difference between accept-
ing and rejecting a plea agreement because while rejection results in the 
defendant receiving a fair trial, a defendant who accepts a plea offer 
waives this right.150 Despite this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit held 
that to establish prejudice, a “‘defendant must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different.’”151 The court there-
fore followed the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Zelinsky.152 It held 
that counsel’s failure to involve the defendant in the decision-making 
process during plea bargain negotiations constituted a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.153 
 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Gordon in 1998 considered the application of the right to effec-
                                                                                                                      
144 See id. 
145 See Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1053. 
146 793 F.2d at 899. 
147 Id. at 900. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 900–01. 
150 Id. at 900. 
151 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
152 See Duckworth, 793 F.2d at 901; see also Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 438 
153 Duckworth, 793 F.2d at 902. Similarly, in 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Turner v. Tennessee held that the right to effective assistance of counsel ap-
plied to not guilty pleas. See 858 F.2d at 1205. The petitioner brought a federal habeas cor-
pus petition on the ground that he received ineffective assistance when counsel advised 
him to reject a proposed plea bargain. See id. at 1203. The court stated that to establish 
prejudice, a “‘defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 
Id. at 1206 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Applying this definition, the court rea-
soned that although neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit had ever ruled on 
this point, the decision “to reject a plea offer” fell within the ambit of the Sixth Amend-
ment. See id. at 1205. 
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tive assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas.154 The defendant argued 
that counsel persuaded him to reject a plea offer by informing him 
that, if he proceeded to trial, the maximum sentence that could be im-
posed was ten years.155 The court observed that the defendant’s right to 
effective counsel attaches at all critical stages in the proceedings.156 It 
stated that plea negotiations are included because the decision to con-
test a criminal charge can be the most important decision in a criminal 
case.157 The Second Circuit then determined that the defendant’s reli-
ance on counsel’s advice affected his decision to stand trial.158 The 
court, therefore, held that counsel’s conduct satisfied the prejudice 
standard articulated in Strickland that there be a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional conduct, the outcome of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.159 
B. The Policy Argument for Extending the Right to Effective Assistance  
of Counsel to Not Guilty Pleas 
 The implicit policy concern underlying courts’ decisions to apply 
the right to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas is that plea 
bargaining is an essential component of the administration of justice.160 
The potential application of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
to not guilty pleas has risen to prominence because of the prevalence of 
plea bargaining in our modern justice system.161 Many commentators 
argue that plea negotiations are one of the most important features of 
                                                                                                                      
154 See 156 F.3d at 380. 
155 See id. at 377. 
156 Id. at 379. 
157 See id. at 380. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. at 379–81. 
160 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). The Court stated: 
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor 
and the accused, sometimes loosely called “plea bargaining,” is an essential 
component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be 
encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the 
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the 
number of judges and court facilities. 
Id. 
161 See Tara Harrison, The Pendulum of Justice: Analyzing the Indigent Defendant’s Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel When Pleading Not Guilty at the Plea Bargaining Stage, 2006 
Utah L. Rev. 1185, 1194–95; Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Plea 
Bargain Lost, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 431, 452 (1992); Stephen G. Valdes, Note, Frequency and 
Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, 
and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709, 1732–33 (2005). 
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criminal law.162 This contention is based on findings that although plea 
bargaining was practically nonexistent when the Sixth Amendment was 
drafted, judges are now presented with plea agreements in over ninety 
percent of the cases before them.163 For example, in 2002, ninety-five 
percent of felony convictions in state courts and ninety-six percent of 
felony convictions in the federal system were obtained through guilty 
pleas.164 Some critics have asserted that because most statistical analyses 
only include the cases in which the defendant actually pled guilty, it is 
probable that a plea bargain is offered in almost every criminal case.165 
 To explain the pervasiveness of plea bargaining, commentators 
point to crowded court dockets, pretrial detention practices, the poor 
quality of public defenders, financial incentives, incompetent judges, 
and better trained prosecutors and police.166 They have concluded, in 
short, that plea bargaining has proven useful because it allows large 
quantities of cases to be quickly resolved.167 Critics argue that given this 
context, it is vital that the right to effective assistance of counsel be ex-
tended to not guilty pleas.168 This conclusion is based on the view that 
the plea bargaining process is only fair when both sides have adequate 
knowledge and experience.169 
III. A Patchwork of Decisions: Division in the State Courts 
 The state courts are divided over the application of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty 
pleas.170 The courts that invoke the right stand in opposition to those 
that conclude that the right is limited to providing the defendant a fair 
                                                                                                                      
162 See Valdes, supra note 161, at 1732. 
163 See Harrison, supra note 161, at 1194. 
164 Id. 
165 Falzone, supra note 161, at 452. 
166 Harrison, supra note 161, at 1194–95. 
167 Id. at 1195. 
168 Id. at 1207–08. 
169 See id. at 1206. 
170 See, e.g., People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. 1997) (holding that the right to 
effective assistance attaches to not guilty pleas); State v. Monroe, 757 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. 
Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that the right to effective assistance of counsel was not impli-
cated because a defendant who pleads not guilty has no vested interest in the enforcement 
of a plea bargaining contract); State v. Bryan, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) 
(ruling that the right to effective assistance does not attach to not guilty pleas because the 
trial process is not impacted). 
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trial.171 The cases discussed below further develop the substantive ar-
guments behind both positions.172 
A. Applying the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 The seminal state case supporting the application of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas was decided by the Su-
preme Court of California in 1992 in In re Alvernaz.173 The court re-
jected the appellate court’s conclusion that because the defendant re-
ceived a fair trial, he could not be constitutionally prejudiced.174 It first 
noted that plea bargaining is an integral component of our justice sys-
tem that has been deemed a critical stage in the criminal process.175 
From this conclusion, the court held that both alternatives available to 
a defendant, pleading guilty and pleading not guilty, required the same 
attorney-client interaction and invoked the same professional obliga-
tions.176 It therefore determined that the application of the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel to guilty pleas encompassed the decision to 
reject a plea.177 
 The court also reasoned that the position that a fair trial remedies 
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining disregarded the 
defendant’s specific constitutional injury.178 It explained that the defen-
dant’s argument did not relate to his defense at trial, but to the ineffec-
                                                                                                                      
171 See, e.g., In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 749 (Cal. 1992) (“[W]e conclude . . . that 
when a defendant demonstrates that ineffective representation . . . caused him or her to 
proceed to trial . . . the defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel 
. . . .”); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1189 (Utah 2007) (“Greuber . . . could not ulti-
mately have been prejudiced in this case because he received a trial that was fair—the fun-
damental right that the Sixth Amendment is designed to protect.”). 
172 See infra notes 173–210 and accompanying text. 
173 See 830 P.2d 747. It should be noted that on issues of federal law, the decisions of 
the U.S. courts of appeals are not binding authority in the states in which they reside. See 
People v. Leonard, 157 P.3d 973, 1008 (Cal. 2007) (concluding that a decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was not binding on the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia). 
174 See Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 749, 752. 
175 See id. at 752–53. Many state cases cite the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. 
Lockhart in 1985 as dispositive of the question of whether the right to effective assistance of 
counsel extends to not guilty pleas. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); see also, e.g., 
Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1999). Hill, properly interpreted, stands only for 
the proposition that the decision to plead guilty is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. 
See 474 U.S. at 58. 
176 Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 753–54. 
177 See id. at 754. 
178 Id. 
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tive counsel that prevented him from avoiding trial in the first place.179 
The court further concluded that were it to adopt the ruling of the ap-
pellate court, it would not only deprive the defendant a remedy for his 
specific constitutional injury, but also gravely undermine the plea bar-
gaining process.180 Specifically, it stated that only providing constitu-
tional protection to guilty pleas would engender skewed, asymmetrical 
results.181 For these reasons, the court overruled the conclusion of the 
appellate court.182 
 In 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this same issue in 
People v. Curry.183 The defendant asserted that counsel mistakenly ad-
vised him that he would face a maximum penalty of four-year concur-
rent sentences at trial.184 The court observed that it is well established 
that the right to effective assistance of counsel attaches to not guilty 
pleas.185 It rejected the State’s argument that the defendant could not 
demonstrate prejudice because he had no constitutional right to be 
offered the opportunity to plea bargain.186 The court conceded that 
there is no such constitutional right, but noted that the State opted to 
engage in plea bargain negotiations.187 It reasoned that having received 
a plea offer, the defendant was only required to show a reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. The Supreme Court of California explained that “‘[l]ike the character in the 
short story, criminal defendants facing this choice under asymmetrical constitutional pro-
tection may begin to see one alternative as the lady and the other as the tiger.’” Id. (quot-
ing Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (M.D. Tenn. 1987). 
182 See Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at749. 
183 See 687 N.E.2d at 882. 
184 Id. at 881. 
185 Id. at 882. The Illinois Supreme Court, in noting that the application of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel was “well established,” cited numerous federal and state court 
decisions. See id.; see also, e.g., Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1991); Beckham 
v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 265–67 (5th Cir. 1981); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261, 263 (Nev. 
1988). The less-cited holdings, however, largely restate the reasoning used by the courts dis-
cussed in this Note that have extended the right to effective assistance to not guilty pleas. 
Toro, for example, relies on the conclusions of the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Duckworth and 
the Third Circuit in United States ex. rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky. See Toro, 940 F.2d at 1067; Johnson v. 
Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900–02 (7th Cir. 1986); United States ex. rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 
F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982). The salient point is that no arguments emerge from these cases 
that are not already addressed in this Note. See, e.g., Larson, 766 P.2d at 263 (applying the 
Strickland test in holding that counsel provided ineffective assistance when it successfully 
urged the defendant to plead not guilty). 
186 Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 887–88. 
187 Id. at 888. 
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probability that, but for counsel’s advice regarding potential sentenc-
ing, the result of the proceeding would have been different.188 
 The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Cottle v. 
State in 1999.189 The defendant contended that counsel failed to inform 
him that a plea offer had been extended.190 The court observed that the 
analysis outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington in 
1984 extended to the plea bargaining process because it is a critical stage 
in criminal adjudication.191 It noted that to establish prejudice under 
Strickland, it is customarily required to show that counsel’s errors were 
sufficiently serious to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.192 The court, 
however, gave short shrift to the notion that ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea bargaining was remedied by a subsequent fair 
trial.193 It held, instead, that when counsel failed to notify a defendant of 
a plea offer, the defendant was only required to demonstrate a reason-
able probability that the offer would have been accepted.194 
B. Limiting the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 Recent decisions in several states have limited the scope of the right 
to effective assistance of counsel to protecting the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.195 In 2000, the Louisiana Court of Appeal ruled in State v. Mon-
roe that a defendant preserved all of his legal safeguards when he pled 
not guilty after counsel misrepresented the maximum sentence that 
could be imposed at trial.196 In explaining that only guilty pleas impli-
cate the Constitution, the court compared the plea bargaining process 
to a contract.197 It observed that plea agreements are constitutional con-
tracts.198 Although a party to the contract has a vested interest in its en-
forcement, a party who rejects the contract through a not guilty plea has 
no such vested interest.199 The court concluded that unlike a defendant 
                                                                                                                      
188 Id. at 887–88. 
189 See 733 So. 2d at 967. 
190 See id. at 964. 
191 Id. at 965; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
192 Cottle, 733 So. 2d at 966–67. 
193 See id. at 967. 
194 Id. 
195 See Monroe, 757 So. 2d at 898; Bryan, 134 S.W.3d at 802; Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1188. 
196 See 757 So. 2d at 897–98. 
197 See id. at 898. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
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who pled guilty, the defendant here preserved all of his constitutional 
rights, including his chance of being found not guilty.200 
 In 2004, the Missouri Court of Appeals adopted the same position 
in State v. Bryan.201 The defendant claimed that during the plea bar-
gaining process, counsel failed to advise him that he did not have an 
adequate defense to kidnapping and sodomy charges.202 The court 
found this error constitutionally insignificant because the reliability of 
the final judgment entered against the defendant was unaffected.203 It 
noted that “[o]ne fair trial is all the Constitution requires.”204 The court 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective assistance 
of counsel does not attach unless counsel’s conduct impacts the trial 
process.205 
 In 2007, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the application of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas in State v. Greu-
ber.206 The defendant claimed that counsel was constitutionally ineffec-
tive because it failed to listen to recordings indicating that the defense’s 
planned impeachment strategy was contrary to the evidence.207 The 
court, however, reasoned that the right to effective assistance of counsel 
is not recognized for its own sake, but for the effect that counsel has on 
the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.208 The court, therefore, 
determined that because he received a fair trial, the defendant was pre-
cluded from demonstrating the constitutional prejudice necessary to 
satisfy the Strickland test.209 In justifying this decision, the court ex-
plained that a fair trial is the fundamental right that the Sixth Amend-
ment is intended to protect.210 
                                                                                                                      
200 Id. 
201 See 134 S.W.3d at 802. 
202 Id. at 801. 
203 See id. at 802–03. 
204 Id. at 803–04. 
205 See id. at 802. 
206 See 165 P.3d at 1188. 
207 Id. at 1187. 
208 Id. at 1188–89. 
209 See id. at 1189. 
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IV. The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of the Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 It is evident that two reasonable interpretations of the proper scope 
of the right to effective assistance of counsel exist.211 Equally clear, how-
ever, is the need for a standard to be in accord with the implied position 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.212 The Court’s decisions inform a Sixth 
Amendment analysis and suggest that the right to effective assistance is 
limited to providing the defendant a fair trial.213 The Court has indi-
cated that a critical stage at which the right to effective assistance at-
taches must, unlike a not guilty plea, affect the fairness of the defen-
dant’s trial.214 The U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Strickland v. 
Washington in 1984, moreover, suggests that a defendant who receives a 
fair trial after entering a not guilty plea cannot establish the constitu-
tional prejudice needed to succeed on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance.215 Finally, the Supreme Court has developed seventy years of Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.216 These decisions support the conclusion 
that the gravamen of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the as-
sertion that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.217 
A. The Critical Stage Analysis: Limited to Fair Trials 
 Most courts that have applied the right to effective assistance of 
counsel to not guilty pleas have explicitly observed that the plea-
bargaining process is a critical stage at which the defendant is entitled 
to effective counsel.218 This conclusion is based on the 1967 holding of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, which extended the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to all critical stages of a criminal 
                                                                                                                      
211 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379–80 (2d Cir. 1998); State v. Monroe, 
757 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1188 (Utah 2007). 
212 See e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–94 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
213 See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (“The essence of an in-
effective-assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial 
balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the ver-
dict rendered suspect.”). 
214 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). 
215 See 466 U.S. at 684–94. 
216 See, e.g., Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986); 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
217 See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”). 
218 See, e.g., Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2003); United States ex. 
rel. Caruso v. Zelinksy, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753 
(Cal. 1992). 
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proceeding.219 The Court, however, has never ruled that the decision to 
plead not guilty constitutes a critical stage.220 
 In Wade, the Court expressly outlined the limits of what could be 
considered a critical stage.221 The Court stated that the analyses of fin-
gerprints, blood samples, hair, and clothing were not critical stages be-
cause there was “minimal risk” that counsel’s absence could derogate 
from the defendant’s right to a fair trial.222 Similarly, in United States v. 
Ash in 1973, the Court concluded that the right to effective assistance 
of counsel did not attach during a post-indictment photographic dis-
play.223 It reasoned that this was not a critical stage because accurate 
reconstruction at trial remedied any potential defects.224 
 It follows that the decision to plead not guilty does not constitute a 
critical stage.225 The confrontations in Wade and Ash that were not con-
sidered critical stages were unlikely to affect a defendant’s subsequent 
trial.226 The decision to plead not guilty, similarly, cannot derogate from 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.227 This decision actually has the 
contrary effect of assuring that a defendant, instead of pleading guilty, 
proceeds forward to a fair trial.228 It therefore provides an even more 
compelling reason not to be considered a critical stage.229 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overlooked this 
point in 1982 in United States ex. rel Caruso v. Zelinsky.230 In concluding 
that the decision to reject a plea offer and plead not guilty constituted a 
critical stage, the court ignored the fact that this action did not deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial.231 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned in Nunes v. Mueller in 2003 that the decision to plead 
                                                                                                                      
219 See 388 U.S. at 224. 
220 See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004). The Court concluded only that “[t]he en-
try of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at 
which the right to counsel adheres.” Id. (emphasis added). 
221 See 388 U.S. at 227–28. 
222 Id. 
223 See 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
224 See id. at 319. 
225 See id. 
226 Id.; Wade, 388 U.S. at 227–28. 
227 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 319; Wade, 388 U.S. at 227–28. 
228 See Garcia v. State, 736 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (Gross, J., concurring 
specially) (“[A] defendant whose guilt is determined after a fair trial conducted with all 
the guarantees of the Constitution, has not suffered a deprivation, even where his lawyer’s 
conduct prevented him from negotiating or accepting a better deal. . . . [H]is guilt has 
been established in the manner envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution.”). 
229 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 319; Wade, 388 U.S. at 227–28. 
230 See 689 F.2d at 438. 
231 See id. 
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not guilty was a critical stage because the time between a defendant’s 
arraignment and the start of trial can be the most important period of 
a criminal proceeding.232 The court failed to recognize why this period 
was considered so decisive.233 This part of a criminal proceeding is 
deemed crucial because much of what transpires can derogate from the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.234 The entry of a not guilty plea, how-
ever, has no effect on the fairness of a defendant’s subsequent trial.235 
 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Gordon in 1998 determined that the entry of a not guilty plea 
was a critical stage because the decision to plead guilty or challenge a 
criminal charge was the most important decision of a criminal proceed-
ing.236 The court failed to recognize that guilty and not guilty pleas 
have distinct ramifications.237 The decision to enter a guilty plea is the 
most important decision of a criminal case because the defendant sacri-
fices his constitutional right to a fair trial.238 The decision to plead not 
guilty, in contrast, preserves this right and is therefore less significant.239 
B. A Fair Trial Precludes a Finding of Constitutional Prejudice 
 The courts that have determined that the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel attaches to not guilty pleas almost universally have 
                                                                                                                      
232 350 F.3d at 1052–53. The court further held that the U.S. Supreme Court in Hill v. 
Lockhart “applied that right (and the corresponding Strickland analysis) ‘to ineffective-
assistance claims arising out of plea process.’” Id. at 1052 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted Hill, however, because that case only 
applied the critical stage analysis to ineffective assistance claims arising from guilty pleas. See 
Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
233 See Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1052–53. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See 156 F.3d at 379–80. 
237 See id. 
238 See, e.g., Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a de-
fendant who pleads guilty waives constitutional protections like the right to trial by jury). 
239 See id. (“The rejection of a plea agreement . . . will result in the defendant going to 
trial with all of the concomitant constitutional safeguards that are part and parcel of our 
judicial process.”). Other courts, in determining that the decision to plead not guilty con-
stitutes a critical stage, have also discounted the fact that this decision cannot derogate 
from a defendant’s right to a fair trial. See Alvernaz, 830 P.3d at 753; Cottle v. State, 733 So. 
2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1999). In Cottle v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that the plea 
process is “a critical stage in criminal adjudication, which warrants the same constitutional 
guarantee of effective assistance as trial proceedings.” 733 So. 2d at 965. In 1992, the Su-
preme Court of California in In re Alvernaz ruled that “[t]he pleading-and plea bargaining-
stage of a criminal proceeding is a critical stage in the criminal process at which a defen-
dant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and Cali-
fornia Constitutions.” 830 P.3d at 753. 
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cited a single passage from the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington in 1984.240 The passage states that to establish 
constitutional prejudice, the “defendant must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”241 This statement, 
however, cannot be read in isolation.242 
 The Court began its analysis by observing that the Sixth Amend-
ment exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.243 It then 
outlined the standard for overturning criminal convictions based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.244 The Court explained that to estab-
lish constitutional prejudice, the second prong of the Strickland test, the 
defendant must do more than demonstrate that counsel’s errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.245 It noted 
that this standard is met only when it is shown that the defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial where the outcome is reliable.246 The Court con-
cluded that the “benchmark” for judging ineffective assistance claims is 
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just result.247 
 In sum, the Court’s statements in Strickland indicate that the right 
to effective assistance of counsel is tied to providing the defendant a 
fair trial.248 Counsel’s mistakes, when followed by a fair trial, are not 
constitutionally significant.249 It therefore holds that the decision to 
plead not guilty, which assures that a defendant will proceed to a fair trial, 
cannot satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.250 
 Many courts have overlooked this limitation.251 In 1998, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Gordon 
that Strickland’s standard for constitutional prejudice was satisfied be-
cause there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s conduct, 
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the result of the proceeding would have been different.252 It reached 
this conclusion despite the fact that the defendant’s fair trial was, pur-
suant to the clear thrust of Strickland, all that the Sixth Amendment 
guaranteed.253 
 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the same position in People v. 
Curry in 1997.254 The court observed that although there is no constitu-
tional right to plea bargain, the State decided to engage in plea bargain 
negotiations.255 It concluded that the defendant, having received a plea 
offer, had to demonstrate only a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s advice regarding potential sentencing, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.256 The court thus ignored the de-
fendant’s fair trial and improperly expanded the scope of the right to 
effective assistance beyond the parameters established by Strickland.257 
C. U.S. Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 The courts that have concluded that the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel attaches to not guilty pleas also have discounted sev-
enty years of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that provides insight 
into the scope of the Sixth Amendment.258 The Court’s seminal hold-
ings suggest that the right to effective assistance of counsel is limited to 
providing the defendant a fair trial.259 
 In 1984, the Court explained in United States v. Cronic that the right 
to effective assistance exists to protect the right of the accused to de-
mand that the prosecution’s case survive the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial confrontation.260 The Court stated that the right to effective 
                                                                                                                      
252 See 156 F.3d at 379–81. 
253 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–94; Gordon, 156 F.3d at 379–81. 
254 See 687 N.E.2d at 887–88. 
255 Id. at 888. 
256 Id. at 887–88. Numerous courts have dispensed with Strickland’s decision to limit the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to providing the defendant a fair trial by citing the 
same passage. See, e.g., Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988); Duckworth, 
793 F.2d at 900; Cottle, 733 So. 2d at 966–67. In Cottle, the Florida Supreme Court conceded 
that to establish prejudice, it is customarily required under Strickland, to show that coun-
sel’s mistakes deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 733 So. 2d at 966–67. The court con-
cluded, however, that “[w]here the defendant was not notified of a plea offer, courts have 
held that the claimant must prove,” to a reasonable probability, that the defendant would 
have accepted the offer instead of proceeding to trial. Id. at 967. 
257 See Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 887–88. 
258 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369–72 (1993); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932). 
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260 466 U.S. at 656. 
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assistance of counsel is not recognized for its own sake, but because of 
its impact on a defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.261 Similarly, the 
Court reasoned in Nix v. Whiteside in 1986 that the “benchmark” of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the fairness of the adversary 
proceeding.262 Finally, the Court delineated the scope of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez in 2006.263 
It noted that, in contrast to the right to select counsel, the right to ef-
fective counsel was limited to guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial.264 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s indications through its Sixth Amendment 
analysis easily refute the reasoning of the courts that applied the right 
to effective assistance to not guilty pleas.265 
 In 1992, the Supreme Court of California in In re Alvernaz con-
cluded that the right to effective assistance attached to not guilty 
pleas.266 It reasoned that the decision to plead guilty and the decision 
to plead not guilty involved the same attorney-client interaction and the 
same professional obligations of counsel.267 The court failed to under-
stand, however, that both decisions did not involve the same conse-
quences.268 It neglected to address the fact that, unlike a defendant who 
pleads guilty, a defendant who pleads not guilty retains the right to a 
fair trial.269 
 The court also observed that the position that a fair trial remedied 
counsel’s ineffective assistance disregarded the defendant’s specific 
constitutional injury.270 It explained that the defendant, due to coun-
sel’s errors, was deprived of the opportunity to avoid trial.271 The court 
did not grasp that the defendant, in enjoying a fair trial, received the 
limits of the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment.272 Lastly, the 
Supreme Court of California stated that limiting the scope of the right 
to effective assistance of counsel to providing the defendant a fair trial 
would gravely undermine the plea bargaining process.273 The court 
noted that accepting or rejecting a plea offer presented a binary 
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choice.274 It reasoned that providing constitutional protection when a 
defendant pled guilty, but refusing this protection when a defendant 
pled not guilty could produce a skewing of results.275 The court did not 
comprehend that this asymmetry should exist.276 Only when a guilty 
plea is entered does the defendant sacrifice the right to a fair trial that 
the Sixth Amendment protects.277 
 In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United 
States ex. rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky held that the defendant was constitutionally 
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to communicate a plea offer.278 The court 
explained that the defendant was prejudiced because he was deprived of 
the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser sentence.279 It observed that 
this deprivation was not remedied by his subsequent fair trial.280 This 
conclusion was unsound, however, because it ignored the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s position that a fair trial is all that the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees.281 
 In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed this issue in Johnson v. Duckworth.282 The court noted that there 
is a “significant difference” between the consequences of the decision 
to reject a plea offer and the decision to plead guilty.283 It held, how-
ever, that the defendant had the right to be informed of a plea offer 
and to contribute to the decision to accept or reject it.284 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit discounted the suggestions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.285 The court failed to adequately account for the 
“significant difference” between a guilty plea and a not guilty plea.286 
Specifically, the court was not persuaded by the point that the decision 
to plead guilty implicates the right to effective assistance of counsel be-
cause the defendant is deprived of a fair trial.287 It failed to recognize 
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that a not guilty plea, in contrast, preserves the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.288 
D. The Correct Interpretation of the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 The proper scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel is 
delineated by the decisions of courts that have limited the right to pro-
viding the defendant a fair trial.289 These courts have recognized that 
because a fair trial is all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, it fol-
lows, ipso facto, that a defendant convicted at a fair trial cannot demon-
strate ineffective assistance.290 This limitation was best articulated by the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal in State v. Monroe in 2000.291 In explaining 
that only guilty pleas implicate the Constitution, the court observed 
that plea agreements are akin to constitutional contracts.292 Although a 
party to the contract has a vested interest in its enforcement, a party 
who rejects the contract in a not guilty plea has no such vested inter-
est.293 The court concluded that a defendant who entered a not guilty 
plea preserved all of his constitutional rights.294 
 This position does not discount the policy concerns that the courts 
applying a broad interpretation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel implicitly attempted to address.295 Congress and state legisla-
tures are not precluded from extending the right to effective assistance 
of counsel to not guilty pleas.296 One commentator notes that a similar 
approach was successfully adopted in the context of post-conviction 
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proceedings.297 The crucial point is that this right is not protected by 
the Sixth Amendment.298 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that it 
will only expand the right to effective assistance of counsel to contexts 
that present the danger that the right was originally designed to pro-
tect.299 This danger—the deprivation of a fair trial—is not present when 
a defendant pleads not guilty.300 
Conclusion 
 The pervasiveness of plea bargaining in our modern justice system 
has made the proper scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel an important issue. In concluding that the right 
applies to not guilty pleas, too many courts that have addressed this 
question have overlooked the implied position of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Court has never directly addressed the application of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to not guilty pleas. The Court’s 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, however, indicates that a defendant 
does not have the right to effective counsel when entering a not guilty 
plea because this is not a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. Assum-
ing arguendo that a defendant who pleads not guilty is entitled to effec-
tive counsel, the Supreme Court’s holdings suggest that a subsequent 
fair trial precludes a finding of the constitutional prejudice needed to 
meet the Strickland test for overturning criminal convictions arising 
from ineffective assistance of counsel. When confronting this issue, fu-
ture courts should limit the application of the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel to providing the defendant a fair trial. 
Leigh Tinmouth 
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